Wednesday, July 13, 2011

Bangladesh Islamists Impasse: The Way Out -By Shah Abdul Halim


[ Mr. Shah Abdul Halim is a researcher and Chairman of Bangladesh Center for Islam and Pluralism. He prefers to describe this article is his political thinking as a cultural activist. Opinions expressed in this article are of writer's and though we may not agree with all of his views and analysis yet we consider it thought-provoking. He can be reached Email: sah1947@yahoo.com ]

In July 2008 I attended an international workshop on ‘Politics and Islam’ in Islamabad that was organized by Henry L. Stimson Center, a Washington based U. S. Think Tank. Diaa Rashwan, Director of Al Ahram Center for Political Strategic Studies Egypt attended the event. We had a good discussion on the political situation in Egypt and the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in the sideline of the workshop. Diaa then informed me that Brotherhood is planning to float a new political party. The debate was then going on “whether this prospective party will be a means for the Muslim Brotherhood to carry out its public and political work, or if it will replace the Brotherhood entirely” [Diaa Rashwan, Political Islamists Movements: The Case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in Islam and Politics: Renewal and Resistance in the Muslim World, Stimson Regional Voices, Henry L. Stimson Center Washington, 2009, pp 3-16]. Now in the backdrop of the downfall of President Hosni Mubarak, Brotherhood has floated a new political party - Freedom and Justice Party. The Muslim Brotherhood would however continue to operate as the parent organization.

What is the lesson Islamists in Bangladesh can draw from the Egyptian experience is a very pertinent question now hitting the mind of the political observers here. In Bangladesh the mainstream Islamist, the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, analysts say, has lost much of its creditability for opposing the liberation war of the country in 1971. Whether this analysis is right or wrong, the fact remains that the secular forces here have been quite successful to discredit Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami in the public eyes and have also been successful to poison the minds of the new generation of people against it. That being the scenario, many analysts consider Jamaat-e-Islami as a “spent force” [Abid Ullah Jan, Moderate Islam: A Product of American Extremism, American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, jointly published by Association of Muslim Social Scientists and International Institute of Islamic Thought, Herndon, V.A., U. S. A., Vol. 22, No. 3, Summer 2005, p 35]. It has hardly any future.

In this backdrop, a workshop was held in Dhaka in July 2009. It was participated by all former Presidents of Islami Chhattra Shibir, the student wing of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, three Assistant Secretary Generals of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, quite a few well-known lawyers, several retired government officials, eminent educationists and some other Islamist intellectuals [Weekly Budhbar, 7 October 2009].

The main theme of the paper presented in PowerPoint was to float a new political party in the model of Turkish Justice and Development Party, otherwise known as A. K. Party with the avowed objectives of promoting public welfare, good governance, safeguarding the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, besides protecting the nation’s economic interest, particularly safeguarding gas and other mineral resources. Some people as back as April 1998 also had written to the top leadership of Jamaat to float a new party with liberal and democratic aims and objectives committed to establishing social justice, peace, stability and bringing prosperity to the nation.

The workshop paper of July 2009 also recommended that the proposed party must distance itself from the demand of a theological state and strict compliance of shariah in public life. The recommendation of not bringing shariah into politics came in the light of the recently carried out ijtihad or search on the application of shariah which says: “Negus, the Emperor of Abyssinia, who embraced Islam but did not rule as per shariah as that would have threatened his Kingdom. … From this it becomes clear that Muslims can rule without implementing shariah if the circumstances are not in their favor or the people are not ready for such reform or the situation is not healthy enough or conducive for such a transformation or change” [Sheikh Rachid Ghannouchi, The Participation of Islamists in Non-Islamic Government in Azzam Tamimi ed. Power-Sharing Islam, Liberty for Muslims World Publications, London, U. K., 1993, pp 57-58. Also see Prof. Dr. Yusuf al Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening Between Rejection and Extremism, I. I. I. T., Virginia, U. S. A., 1991, pp 137-138. Further see Shah Abdul Halim, Concept of Sovereignty and Other Issues, www.shahfoundationbd.org]. An Nahadah Party ideologue Sheikh Rachid Ghannouchi, in the backdrop of the recent change in Tunisia, has returned to the country from long exile in the United Kingdom and has declared that An Nahadah will not bring shariah into politics  

Meanwhile Muhammad Kamaruzzaman, Senior Assistant Secretary General of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami who is now in prison facing the charge of war crimes for alleged involvement in human rights violation during the liberation war has circulated a political discourse dated 26 November 2010 to a select group of top Jamaat leaders as to what strategy need to be adopted in the country’s changed political environment.  Its copy has been leaked to the press. Reformists within Jamaat have however widely circulated photocopies of this political advice among the Jamaat activists, followers and sympathizers and it is now in everybody’s possession. Kamaruzzaman in his political discourse has also advised Jamaat to form a new political platform with new policy and strategy outlines [Daily Kalerkantho, 28 February 2011]. 

In his paper Kamaruzzaman has given the outline of the proposed party. He suggested that Jamaat leaders against whom charges of war crimes hang should not be in any way linked with the new party. But many others believe this is perhaps not enough. Since the agenda of the Islamists should be the progress and advancement of Islam in society, the new party should be manned and headed by people from post-liberation generation, those who are born after 1971, against whom there cannot be any charge of war crimes or stigma of collaboration with the Pakistan army. The proposed party should even scrupulously avoid associating the family members or close relatives of pre-liberation Jamaat leaders in the new party. There should not be any illusion about this. No mental obsession should also be there though it may be painful. It might appear to some as regression or a step back from Islamic call and guidance but it will ultimately pave the way for a stride and forward march creating a new environment where Islamic politics may make new leap forward.  

The proposed party should be totally democratic in architecture. Centralize authority must be discarded in the new party. The weakness of the Islamist movement is that although it believes in human equality in principle but it has failed to translate such equality in real life practice in the state and the society as a whole. Malaysian scholar Dr. Chandra Muzaffar rightly pointed out: “If one looks at the contemporary situation, one could argue that contemporary Islamic movements have by and large, with a few exceptions such as the An Nahdah Party of Sheikh Rachid Ghannouchi, inherited this notion of equality and political, economic, social, and gender relations from the history … It is a notion of equality which has been embodied in the fiqh tradition, the Islamic tradition of jurisprudence, which must be distinguished for the purpose of analysis from the divinely rooted shariah. It is this fiqh tradition, which has formed the basis of Islamic movement’s approach to this fundamental question of equality in society. What Islamic movements have done the most notable amongst them being the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-e-Islami, is to say that they have accepted equality as an important principle at the general level. However, when it comes to translating that principle into specifics you will find that there are many inequalities and that they accept the inequality as divinely sanctioned. … For example, in the realm of politics the fiqh oriented approach of contemporary Islamic movements is to say that you need a powerful ruler, a ruler who would centralize authority and thus be able to establish the norms and principles of an Islamic polity. That this in itself an act of inequality is something that does not occur to them. You will find that within these Islamic movements there is very little support for the idea of people’s participation and empowering the individuals. Rather there exists this notion of a strong leader at the apex of society” [Shah Abdul Halim, Islamic Movement: An Overview, www.shahfundationbd.org].

The leadership structure of the proposed party should be built like a pyramid - bottom-up approach from grassroots to the center, instead of top-bottom approach, where the leader at the apex nominates rest of the leadership having the veto power to overrule the decision of consultative committee and executive committee. In keeping with the true spirit and tradition of democracy, the new party would allow its members the unbridled freedom and opportunity to elect leadership and in no way restrict the exercise of the freedom to choose leadership by limiting their option by way of creating a panel of leadership, which only reflects the senior leader’s lack of trust, faith and confidence on the ability of general members in exercising voting rights judiciously, from which top leaders are to be elected by the members.  

The proposed party should adopt the system of electing leadership at every tier and the current belief and mindset of the Islamists that placing oneself to contest for leadership is contrary to the teachings of Islam must be given-up. History bears testimony that Prophet Yusuf (peace and blessings be upon him) asked Pharaoh to give him the ministerial responsibility of the government to administer the food management to ameliorate the suffering of the people. It means that if the Islamist leadership has any expertise, they are duty bound even today to offer their services for the common good, public wellbeing and social welfare and refusing to offer or give such service shall be tantamount to zulm or oppression. Prophet Yusuf therefore did not hesitate to ask for ministerial responsibility to administer the food management and participate in the administration of Pharaoh to save people from starvation. The same principle should hold good and valid even now. What has happened to Prophet Yusuf can repeat to Muslims today. Muslims are permitted to ask for leadership position and join government to fulfill the greater interest of the Muslim community, the ummah and prevent evils and wrongdoings. Failure to do so will lead to undermining the overall interest of the Muslim community, the ummah and allowing the evils to spread and dominate the society. Muslims offer dua or prayers to God to give them leadership over the believers, muttaqina imama. So asking position for leadership cannot be termed as un-Islamic [Shah Abdul Halim, Power Sharing in Islam, www.shahfoundationbd.org].

The new party leadership must abide by the decisions of the shura or consultative committee. The decisions of the consultative committee must be binding on the leader(s) at apex. King Abdul Aziz became a caliph, the fifth rightly guided caliph of Islam, by accepting the binding provision of the shura. After the state of Medina was established and the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), now head of the state, was then ordained by God: Consult them (the Companions) in the (community) affair(s), and when you have reached a decision, then place your trust in God (and implement it) [Al Quran 3: 159]. “Al-Tabari characterizes consultation as one of the fundamental principles of the shariah (azaim al-ahkam), which are essential to the substance and identity of Islamic government. Ibn Taymiyyah held a similar view, observing that God, Most High, commanded the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) to consult the community, despite the fact that he was the recipient of divine revelation. The Quranic command is therefore all the more emphatic with regard to the subsequent generations of Muslims who no longer have the Prophet among them, and no longer have access to direct revelation. Muhammad Abduh has also held that in this verse, consultation is not just a recommendation, but an obligatory command addressed primarily to the head of the state to ensure that it is properly implemented in the government affairs” [Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam, Part Two, Chapter IV Consultation (Shura), Ilmiah Publishers Sdn Bhd, Kuala Lumpur, 1998, pp 40-44].

It is thus evident that shura or consultation is obligatory for the leadership of the political party as they are directly involved with the process of governance of the state. The strength of the shura lies in the fact that consultation brings people closer together, and it provides them with an opportunity to share ideas and voice their views on matters of common concerns. In this way, shura prevents disunity and division among the people. But consultation can only be meaningful and effective when the participants enjoy total freedom to express their views. It would be totally in vain, and would make no sense to say that in Islam the government and for that matter political party is bound by the principle of consultation, and yet should have the liberty to deny the members of the shura  the freedom to express an opinion.
  
It may not be out of context to mention here that Dr. Rezaul Karim, President of Islami Chhattra Shibir, working for the coterie of a section of former Islami Chhattra Sihbir Presidents who consider them more wise and judicious over the collective consultation, refused to accept the decision of the shura in 2009 to nominate Shishir Muhammad Munir as the Secretary General of the student organization. It sparked crisis and caused resignation of 20 out of 34 executive committee members.   

Islami Chhattra Shibir must exercise unbridle freedom and independence as an organization and in no way be subservient to advice from any other person or organization. It must not involve people outside its own organization to mediate or resolve its problems rather must strictly follow its own constitutional provisions in resolving disputes, if ever it arises. Past experience has shown that mediators become partisan. Islami Chhattra Shibir in no way and must not become an organization of sycophant or what Muhammad Kamaruzzaman said: Islami Chhattra Shibir must come out of the fold of ‘lejurbritti’ or sycophancy of any political organization.

In the new party women members should be an integral part of the shura. This will help male members of the shura to have perceptions and views of women on important gender issues along with other national and international subjects to reach a fair, judicious and balanced decision. If women shura or consultative committee is separate, the fact remains that their voice is not heard at the particular moment of taking vital decisions. In the past it has been seen that women parliamentarians and male parliamentarians of the Islamist party are sitting in the same room although the male and female shura members are sitting in separate rooms. These practices are self-contradictory having no logic. Sometimes women are suppressed and their voice is not heard. This is neither Islamic nor democratic. 

Elections to form committees and choose leadership of the proposed party at all levels   must be on the basis of open discussion, secret ballots and open counting.  Counting party election results openly and then declaring the scoring will not create division within the party as some argue; rather this will restore confidence in the rank and file of the new party. This would also meet the requirement of the national Election Commission. It would also break the hands of vicious circles who often manipulate the election results of the party as they do not consider shura binding. It is alleged that such manipulation did occur at different tiers of the student organization. It is also alleged that during party elections, election commissioner had even rigged and manipulated the results of apex body in the recent past.     

The workshop held in July 2009 suggested that the proposed party should not be cadre based. The past experience has shown that cadre system develops privileged-class and a bar on the entry of newcomers to turn it into a mass organization.  The leadership should be developed step by step from the grassroots. The cadre system would have no place at any level in the democratic setup of the new party. The present reporting system on personal conduct which a member has to maintain, according to some insiders, has also proved mischievous and it must be discontinued in the proposed political party.
  
The system of whole-timer should also be discarded in the proposed party. Experience has shown that whole-timers, being totally dependent on the salary of the party, lose freedom and confidence to think independently being afraid of losing favor from the hierarchy where innovation and creativity constitute the lifeline of any organization committed to work for reform and renaissance. Whole-timers are found more interested in protecting their self-interest rather than working to push the right cause and chart out a pragmatic way as it may antagonize the party establishment.

The new party should be prepared to accept women in the leadership including the leadership positions at the apex. The Islamists are not yet ready to accept and embrace women in the leadership, which is another example of inequality between men and women. Those who object to assigning political positions to women forget that in today’s world rulers are only parts of a wider political establishment making the government. Indeed government itself is one of a group of as many institutions that shares out among them the power and authority of the state, which were the domain and used to be exercised by a single ruler in the past, regardless of the title he assumed. During the earlier days of Islam the kholafa-e-rashadeen used to combine in them a whole range of comprehensive and broad authority, over the whole Muslim world which no ruler is expected to exercise now or in foreseeable future, including leading prayers, commanding armies, exercising absolute ijtihad in fiqh besides exercising powers as the supreme judge. These are being performed now by many people at different levels. There is a strict bifurcation and separation of powers. From the point of view of her competence, a woman may be now assigned some of these powers, including the post of the head of the state, because none of these powers, including that of head of the state, constitutes the overall authority over the community [For a detailed discussion as to whether women leadership is allowed in Islam or not see Shah Abdul Halim, Can Woman Become Head of the State or Government, www.shahfoundationbd.org].

The proposed party should have at least one woman Vice President and one woman Assistant Secretary General. The post of the President and the Secretary General should also remain open to contest by women. The Islamist in Bangladesh must take lessons from others. In Iran, which is no doubt an Islamic state, woman has been elected to the post of Vice President.

The new party as a matter of policy should adopt easy options when Islam offers different alternatives in resolving problems. It would always remain open to examine variable choices while deciding policy matters. Some Islamists overemphasize the importance of covering face by woman. A number of Islamist organizations have failed to make difference between local culture and Islamic culture, which is one of the reasons for the backwardness of the Muslims. Covering face of woman is a local culture and has nothing to do with Islam. Those who insist on using total veil by the women are really working to create bottleneck in the progress of Islamic society rather than promoting its advancement [This position of not covering face by women is also shared by Dr. Ahmad Totonji. See Shah Abdul Halim, Totonji on the Backwardness of the Muslim Ummah. www.shahfoundationbd.org].   
  
Eminent Egyptian Islamic scholar Sheikh Adil Salahi commenting on the verses 24:30-31 [Say to the believing men that they should lower their gaze … And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze …   Al Quran 24:30-31] wherein both men and women have been asked to lower their look when fall on the opposite sex, in his regular weekly column ‘Our Dialogue’ in Saudi daily Arab News observed: “The instruction of the verses quoted above is that both men and women are required to keep their eyes cast down, so that when they meet each other, neither should men stare at women nor women at men. The natural question that arises is why man should lower his gaze if the face of woman is totally covered? From the text of the verses it is clearly evident that the face of the woman is not to be covered and therefore man has been advised to lower his look”.  

Muslim Brotherhood leader Abdul Halim Abu Shuqqah commenting on the aforementioned verses said that the intent of the Law Giver is that women need not cover face. He said that if the intention of the Law Giver was to cover the face of women than He would not have asked men to lower the gaze [Abdul Halim Abu Shuqqah, Rasuler Juge Nari Shadhinata (Bengali tr. of Tahrirul Mar’ah Fi Asrir Risalah), Vol. IV, Bangladesh Institute of Islamic Thought (BIIT), Dhaka, 2006, pp 79-80]. 

The Islamists in Bangladesh should take note of the general practice of hijab by women in Indonesia, Malaysia, Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt and Morocco where they keep their face open and they do not cover face with niqab. Women in the Saudi Television also appear without niqab or without covering the face. Even the women leaders of Muslim Brotherhood throughout Middle East, including eminent Brotherhood leader of Egypt Zainab al Ghazali known for her monumental work “Return of the Pharoah: Memoirs in Naser’s Prison’, do not cover their face. It is obligatory that women must not cover their face during hajj.  

Kamaruzzaman’s initiative also called for limiting the tenure of the office of the central president and district presidents of the new party. He proposed to limit the tenure of the central president and the district presidents to three terms. But it would be appropriate to limit the tenure to two consecutive terms of three years each. To bring dynamism in the party, a system may be developed by which leadership is rotated through secret credible elections. Unlike the prevailing practice of the Islamists, at least fifteen posts of vice president and twenty-five posts of assistant secretary general may be created in the proposed party. This would create opportunity to produce more leaders, built up their capacity; evaluate who is more capable and dynamic in sharing responsibility.    

The central leadership structure of the proposed party however may be organized based on how many people it wants to put in the various watchdog committees and in the Shadow Cabinet. This issue will be discussed at the later part of this article. Those found effective at the grassroots, particularly whose performance at the local government lections would be highly impressive and people would accept them as public leaders, should be gradually elevated to the central leadership.
However highly skilled professionals, eminent educationists, senior retired civil and military bureaucrats, celebrated journalists, renowned lawyers, prominent political leaders of other parties and such other notable members of the civil society with secular background, if they accept the aims and objectives and join the new party, should be elevated to the higher echelon of the leadership in keeping with the practice of the noble Prophet who had placed leaders of the days of jahiliyyah or ignorance, when they sincerely accepted Islam and joined the Muslim rank, in the leadership ranks. In other words persons with rich and highly potential background will be absorbed in the new party implementing the spirit of the saying of the Prophet Muhammad: khiarukum fil jahiliyyah khiarukum fil Islam which means - those who proved competent in leadership during the days of jahiliyyah or ignorance they proved equally competent in leadership when they had joined the rank of Islam.

The proposed party will use standard parameters to evaluate the performances of the leadership and their ability to turn the party into a mass organization and effectively run a modern democratic state. Such parameters shall also be used to ascertain the intellectual capacity of the leadership in the context of the changed global environment. While developing such parameters, due consideration shall be given to such factors as professional skill, educational background, intellectual capacity, moral and ethical moorings and more importantly behavioral pattern etc. etc. The new party will also use parameters to make sure that leadership upholds high standard of financial integrity and maintains transparency in all fairness in fund management and monetary transactions. The leadership should also be required to make it certain that their living expenses and increase in wealth and all types of resources should commensurate with the known sources of earnings.     

Past experience shows that concentration of power and responsibility without accountability in few hands make such persons over influential and sometimes quite despotic as the saying goes power makes a man corrupt and absolute power makes a man absolutely corrupt. Power intoxicates best hearts as the wine intoxicates the strongest heads. No man is wise enough or good enough to be trusted with unlimited power. Such concentration of power and responsibility is a bar on the development of collective   leadership of participatory nature. By delegating power only in few hands the leadership at the apex in fact creates a situation in which the prospect of producing a galaxy of leaders, who can handle critical situation, might diminish. The leadership qualities never can be developed unless workload and responsibility are delegated. It is evident from the actual situation within the country’s Islamist organization that the so-called trustworthy leaders at the zenith of the party, who consider themselves the only capable persons and indispensable have in fact developed a sort of bureaucratic mindset. They believe that without them the organization will not be able to sustain and they, in fact, have monopolized power by turning them into a vested group to protect their interests. Some people believe that these few leaders at the top have aggrandized power and position overlooking the greater community interest.  

The proposed party should not allow a person to hold more than one position at a time as was advised by some people in some occasions in July 1996 and April 1998 and now by Muhammad Kamaruzzaman. It needs to be realized that human capacity is limited and at one point it gets saturated. Moreover those who are overburdened with too many jobs may not concentrate on any work or go into details of any issue. Thus the work suffers.  

Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) during his life time sent Muadh b. Jabal (may God be pleased with him) as Governor to Yemen. On being asked by the Prophet as to how he will govern, Muadh b. Jabal replied that he will govern according to the Quran and will refer to sunnah if clear instruction is not available in the Quran and then will exercise his individual judgment if an explicit injunction is neither available in the Quran nor in the sunnah. History bears the testimony that Prophet Muhammad endorsed the governing principle and procedure of Muadh b. Jabal. Prophet even authorized Amr b. al-As (may God be pleased with him) to adjudicate in some disputes in his presence [Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, Islamic Texts Society, Cambridge, 1991, p 383]. From this, analysts conclude that ijtihad or intellectual exercise is allowed in Islam and ijhitad is the sunnah of the Prophet. But what escaped the attention of many scholars and leaders of Islamic call and guidance is that Prophet Muhammad during his life time had delegated powers to Muadh b. Jabal and Amr b. al-As [This view is also shared by Dr. Anas S. Al Shaikh Ali, Academic Advisor, I.I.I.T, London, U.K].  

This delegation is the pivotal precept of Islam and democracy. Unless you delegate, you really suffocate. Nothing can flourish in a suffocating and regimented environment. The new party must practice the system of delegating power and responsibility and the leadership at the apex will only give guidance and monitor developments. Everything, except confidential matters, should be delegated.  Delegation is the opposite of imposing decision. It means power through people and not over the people. Delegation is the negation of manipulation. It is motivation through participation. Authority must be delegated at all tires of the proposed party so that decisions may be taken by way of participation at every level.  

Muhammad Kamaruzzaman has also advised to form Shadow Cabinet. In fact Shadow Cabinet to monitor governance and Think Tank to formulate policies must be inseparable part of the proposed party. The new party, at the time of launching, should announce a Shadow Cabinet of 100 ministers. Each minister will be assisted by a Think Tank that would include three professionals in addition to ten researchers in respective fields. Each Think Tank professional members will also be members of the central consultative committee, and one, from amongst them, by rotation will represent the group to the central executive committee. Professional members should have the rights and privilege that if anyone of them requests the leadership at the apex to call a meeting of the central consultative committee and central executive committee; they shall be bound to call such a meeting. However such professional members may or may not have voting rights. Along with the 100 Think Tanks, an Advisory Council or Guardian Council or Council of Elders may be set up. Yet another Council of Eminent Ulama or religious scholars, as advised by Muhammad Kamaruzzaman, may also be constituted [The idea of formation of Shadow Cabinet of hundred ministers each of whom will head a Think Tank is also shared by Dr. Ahmad Totonji. See Shah Abdul Halim, Totonji on the Backwardness of the Muslim Ummah. www.shahfoundationbd.org].    

In keeping with the democratic tradition, the proposed party should always arrive at a decision by a vote of majority and those who disagree with the decision of the majority will have the right to record the note of dissent. Recording the note of dissent must be practiced in the new party as a binding principle. That is the only way to break the hands of the conspirators, coteries and reactionary forces that sometimes try to impose undesirable decision in the name of collective decision. Now that in the new party everyone can record their views because of the binding principle of recording the note of dissent, the conspirators and coteries will be fearful of being exposed and they will be much careful not to impose any undesirable opinion. There is no point of giving unnecessary concession in the name of consensus decision.

Moreover the new party will have to adopt such a constitution that will allow its leaders to hold and express divergent views publicly as is practiced by the political parties in the United States. Expressing constructive and positive views contrary to the declared and established party policies openly, even in front of media, will not be in anyway considered a revolt against the party, its leadership or its policies. Those leaders who will be able to win the confidence of the majority party members will be at the helm of affairs. There is no point of demanding the repeal of article 70 of Bangladesh Constitution to enable a member of the parliament to cross floor and express opinion against the very party to which s/he belongs when such freedom is not allowed within the political parties.  

The proposed party not only should make room for non-Muslims becoming its members but at the same time reiterate in clear terms that it is committed to make such constitutional arrangements that will remove obstacles of non-Muslim becoming the head of the state. This will be in keeping with the political system envisaged by the Islamist political scientists of modern time. The plural and democratic nature of Islamist political order also becomes clear if someone looks at the constitutional proposals of the Muslim Brotherhood, the premier Islamist movement of the world. In 1952   Brotherhood drafted an Islamic Constitution for Egypt consisting of 103 articles.

The draft constitution puts forth the notion of a civil state based on citizenship and loyalty to the state. Muslim Brotherhood puts forward the idea of one state embracing Muslims and non-Muslims under the umbrella of loyalty to the nation (article - 88). The draft constitution reiterates that people are born free, equal in dignity, rights and liberties without any discrimination based on origin, language, religion or color (article - 77). The word used in this article is people, an inclusive neutral word in the Islamic heritage, which negates any kind of discrimination based on sex or religion. Each individual has the right to live freely, enjoying equality, security and safety (article - 78). The draft did not determine religion when recording rights. It used the word individual.

The Islamic Constitution drafted by the Brotherhood disregarded one’s religion being the prerequisite of becoming the head of the state. Article – 4 stipulates that only an Egyptian can be a member of the parliament and parliamentary membership is not restricted to any particular religion or cult and article – 25 states that head of the state can be any person who meets all the conditions required for the Member of Parliament and all these disregard origin, language and religion which is compatible with the aforementioned article - 77 of the constitution. [The Legal Concept of an Islamic State According to the MB, Ikhwanweb – Cairo, Egypt, Monday, May 08, 2006. Also see Shah Abdul Halim, The Concept of Ummah and Pluralist Bangladesh. www.shahfoundationbd.org].

The proposed party must affirm in the most unambiguous language that it believes in absolute religious freedom. The Quran states: There is no compulsion in religion [Al Quran 2: 256]. As regards apostasy, which has created a great deal of controversy and misunderstanding among the freedom loving people, the new party must make clear its position in the light of the injunction of the Quran: Those who believe, then disbelieve, then believe again, then disbelieve and then increase in their disbelief – God will never forgive them nor guide them to the path [Al Quran 4: 137]. Commenting on the verse Mohammad Hashim Kamali pointed out: “The implication is unmistakable. The text would hardly entertain the prospect of repeated belief and disbelief if death were to be the prescribed punishment for the initial act” [Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam, Chapter IX. - Freedom of Religion (Al-Hurriyyah al-Diniyyah), Ilmiah Publishers, Kuala Lumpur, 1998, pp 97-98]. In fact there is not a single instance that Prophet Muhammad did treat apostasy as a prescribed offence under hudd (plural hudud) or capital punishment only for leaving Islam. Prophet never put anyone to death for apostasy alone rather he let such person go unpunished. No one was sentenced to death solely for renunciation of faith unless accompanied by hostility and treason or was linked to an act of political betrayal of the community. As a matter of fact the Quran is completely silent on the question of death as a punishment for apostasy. Apostasy does not qualify for temporal punishment. The most pertinent question is: If God has granted us the merit of freedom, he who wants to believe is allowed that right and so too the one who wants to disbelieve. How can it be imagined by a rational person that God, Who has compelled none to believe, allows us the right to compel others and force them to believe [See Shah Abdul Halim, Islam & Pluralism, www.shahfoundationbd.org].

The new party should make a call for suspension of hudd or capital punishment in such areas as adultery as long as the door of obscenity - similar to brothels, bars, offensive movies, obscene printed books and pornography - remains open; and the government cannot ensure marriage at appropriate age. Eminent Islamic scholar and Dean of the Faculty of Shariah, Qatar University Prof. Dr. Yusuf Al Qaradawi opined that before implementing hudd or capital punishment as punishment of adultery, we have to establish an ideal  Islamic society and close the door of obscenity [Prof. Dr. Yusuf Al Qaradawi, Shariatul Islam Khuluduha Wa Salahuha Lit-tatbiki Fi Kulli Jamanin Wa Makan, Bengali tr. Islami Shariater Bastobayan, Oddhai- Bartaman Juga Islami Shariat Bastobayaner Purba Sharta, Khairun Prokashani, Dhaka, 2003, pp 174-179]. Only recently Prof. Dr. Tariq Ramadhan, a distinguished educator of Philosophy at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland and an eminent Arab Islamic scholar, has given a clarion call for the suspension of hudd or capital punishment for the time being, till all relevant issues have been examined by the scholars. Such suspension will be in line with the suspension of the amputation of hands of the thief by Caliph Omar (may God be pleased with him) in a famine condition when people are without food and they resort to stealing [Shah Abdul Halim, Intent of the Islamic Law, www.shahfoundationbd.org].

The Islamists in Bangladesh failed to make any substantial headway in the political front during the last 64 years [1947-2011] as they largely ignored the cultural arena that deserve utmost attention. It is essential to put utmost emphasis to cultural activism to make breakthrough in the political front. In fact cultural activism deserves more emphasis than political work as the past experience has proved beyond doubt that concentrating more on political work ignoring or giving less emphasis on cultural work has failed to generate the desired political dividend.

The Islamists failed to cultivate those aspects of the local and folk culture, even finer thread of classical music and mystic songs, which does not stand in clash with our beliefs, values, ethics and norms. They have also ignored local heroes, charming natural beauty of Bangladesh; and local cultural symbols are also missing in their cultural projections. Cultural movement is the lifeline of any movement committed to bring in social reforms and renaissance. Therefore a very comprehensive cultural policy needs to be formulated and action program drawn.    

Further it needs to be realized that religion is ever present in our real life and existence, culture and thought. People here are basically liberal, broadminded and moderate and opposed to constriction, bigotry, and fanaticism. People are religious but at the same time against all types of overindulgence and severity. We have to construct our political philosophy by assimilating all these elements of our mores, history and culture, customs and traditions.

The proposed party shall not work to establish a theological state but still then maintain deep links with norms and ethics of Islam and core components of Muslim identity. It is largely believed that only an identity consciousness, educated and intellectually empowered community can bring change in the society. People associated with the proposed party will be encouraged to read contemporary Islamic literature of the eminent scholars, not plagiarized books or fifty years old books which has no relevance to modern day society and its problems, particularly when modern day scholars have reached newer conclusions through ijtihad i.e. intellectual exercise on old and newly emerging issues. There is no reason and justification to repeat old arguments. Reading only one set of literature will result in a narrow tunnel-vision and will take the new generation nowhere.

Bangladesh is passing through the most critical period in its history. The proposed party therefore must formulate its policy keeping in view the geopolitical and strategic compulsions and erect invincible wall to protect the national interest standing on the hard rock and not on the quicksand. The proposed party must be pragmatic, open to all yet conscious of its goal. It is suggested that a rational, moderate and people oriented socio-cultural and political program be formulated which is suitable to the genius of the people of Bangladesh.

Last but not the least, the proposed political party, true to the democratic culture and tradition, will maintain harmonious relations with every other political organization. But it will not, in any away, subordinate itself to any other political organization or leader however sagacious seemingly they might appear to be. The new party will not maintain extra territorial or secret link with any other political organization or leader who may tend to control it or influence its functioning. It will strictly follow its own constitution and single-handedly try to accomplish its own policies and objectives. The new party will never take position on political issues in opposition to the dreams, wishes and aspirations of the overwhelming majority people. But the million dollar question is: who and where are those young political leaders born after 1971 who will make a call for the formation of such a party to bring an end to the current impasse of the Islamists in Bangladesh and usher in an  era of a bright prosperous future.



References
[1] Diaa Rashwan, Political Islamists Movements: The Case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in Islam and Politics: Renewal and Resistance in the Muslim World, Stimson Regional Voices, Henry L. Stimson Center Washington, 2009.
[2] Abid Ullah Jan, Moderate Islam: A Product of American Extremism, American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, jointly published by Association of Muslim Social Scientists and International Institute of Islamic Thought, Herndon, V.A., U. S. A., Vol. 22, No. 3, Summer 2005.
 [3] Sheikh Rachid Ghannouchi, The Participation of Islamists in Non-Islamic Government in Azzam Tamimi ed. Power-Sharing Islam, Liberty for Muslims World Publications, London, U. K., 1993.

 [4] Prof. Dr. Yusuf al Qaradawi, Islamic Awakening between Rejection and Extremism, I. I. I. T., Virginia, U. S. A., 1991.
[5] Prof. Dr. Yusuf Al Qaradawi, Shariatul Islam Khuluduha Wa Salahuha Lit-tatbiki Fi Kulli Jamanin Wa Makan, Bengali tr. Islami Shariater Bastobayan, Oddhai- Bartaman Juga Islami Shariat Bastobayaner Purba Sharta, Khairun Prokashani, Dhaka.

[6] Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom of Expression in Islam, Ilmiah Publishers Sdn Bhd, Kuala Lumpur, 1998.
[7] Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, Islamic Texts Society, Cambridge, 1991.
[8] Sheikh Adil Salahi, Our Dialogue, The Daily Arab News, Saudi Arabia.

[9] Abdul Halim Abu Shuqqah, Rasuler Juge Nari Shadhinata (Bengali tr. of Tahrirul Mar’ah Fi Asrir Risalah), Vol. IV, Bangladesh Institute of Islamic Thought (BIIT), Dhaka, 2006.
 [10] Dr. Anas S. Al Shaikh Ali, Academic Advisor, I.I.I.T., London, U. K.
11] Weekly Budhbar, 7 October 2009.

[12] Daily Kalerkantho, 28 February 2011. 

[13] Shah Abdul Halim, Concept of Sovereignty and Other Issues, www.shahfoundationbd.org
[14] Shah Abdul Halim, Can Woman Become Head of the State or Government, www.shahfoundationbd.org
[15] Shah Abdul Halim, Totonji on the Backwardness of the Muslim Ummah, www.shahfoundationbd.org      

[16] Shah Abdul Halim, Islam and Democracy: How Far Compatible? www.shah foundationbd.org
[17]   Shah Abdul Halim, Islamic Movement: An Overview, www.shahfoundationbd.org
[18] Shah Abdul Halim, Woman: Chastisement & Other Issues, www.shah foundationbd.org
[19]   Shah Abdul Halim, Islam: Women and Society, www.shahfoundationbd.org
[20] Shah Abdul Halim, Muslim Society: Reasons for Backwardness, www.shah foundationbd.org
[21] Shah Abdul Halim, Power Sharing in Islam, www.shahfoundationbd.org
[22] Shah Abdul Halim, The Concept of Ummah and Pluralist Bangladesh, www.shahfoundationbd.org

[23] Shah Abdul Halim, Islam & Pluralism, www.shahfoundationbd.org

[24] Shah Abdul halim, Intent of the Islamic Law, www.shahfoundationbd.org

[25] Shah Abdul Halim, Khimar to Cover Bosom, 22 May 2008, Unpublished Work.

 Article prepared on 1 July 2011



















Friday, January 21, 2011

Judaism as a kind of Islam -by Ben Abrahamson

 
Both Islam and Judaism agree that there is only one acceptable deen (religion) for all mankind. In Hebrew we have called it yireh shamayim (God fearers, submitters), bnei noah. In Aramaic we called it salamai (the complete ones). In Arabic you call it islam.

Both Islam and Judaism agree that Allah SWT has revealed multiple Shari'ahs (covenants) to groups of people over time. Allah SWT revealed different sets of laws for an Ummah to serve Him in the most perfect way

Where we might differ with some Muslims is that we believe that these Shari'ahs are still active and valid for their Ummah. This is supported by the Qu'ran: "And why do they come to you for a decision while they have the Torah, in which is the Decision of Allah SWT... " (Ma'minim 5.43) and the ahaddith explicitly say that the Mahdi will judge the Jews by the shari'ah of the Torah, Muslims by the shari'ah of the Qur'an etc. Many muslims do not know this. Some draw from Christian theology that the Torah has been abrogated and replaced, but this is not supported by the Qur'an or ahaddith.

"Those who believe, those who are Jews, and the Christians and Sabaeans, all who believe in Allah SWT and the Last Day and act rightly, will have their reward with their Lord. They will feel no fear and will know no sorrow." (Surat Al-Baqara 62)

Rabbi Benamozegh - my teacher - develops the concept of "covenant". He explains that it is like groups of craftsman who gather to build a great palace for a king. Each group thinks that it is the best and most correct, and it is indeed so, because each group is the best and most perfect in its trade. The carpenters are best at what they do. The bricklayers are the best at what they do. The electricians are the best at what they do. What one group teaches as the best way for it to contribute to building the palace, would not be correct for another group. Mixing of talents and techniques would between the groups would reduce the speciality and diversity needed to create the most perfect palace. The diet, clothing and training of each group must necessarily be different. The goal of all of them is the same, and they should compete as if in a race.

Historically, Jews know that for centuries, hundreds of thousands of righteous righteous non-Jews would worship together with the Jews in Jerusalem. The Temple was called by the Prophet "a House of Prayer for All Nations". After the destruction of the the Temple by the Romans, the nation was crushed, the children of Israel fled, and pilgrimages to Jerusalem were forbidden.

Many righteous non-Jews lived in what is now Jordan and Arabia . There was an attempt to rebuild a nation of believers there. However the leadership tried to impose the full the Shari'ah of Moses (pbuh) on the righteous non-Jews, instead of the basic faith of Islam (Bnei Noah). It was supposed to be the "Nation of the LORD" yh-vh-iliyyah, but instead the overburdening and inappropriate application of Torah led to a "nation of ignorance" yahiliyyah.

"Those who follow the apostle, the unlettered Prophet, whom they find mentioned in their own (scriptures),- in the law and the Gospel;- for he commands them what is just and forbids them what is evil; he allows them as lawful what is good (and pure) and prohibits them from what is bad (and impure); He releases them from their heavy burdens and from the yokes that are upon them . So it is those who believe in him, honour him, help him, and follow the light which is sent down with him,- it is they who will prosper" (Surat Al-A'raf 157)

Due to war betwen Rome and Persia, both the Jews and Christians were trying to claim "Arabia" for their own, imposing upon them their version of the Shari'ah of Musa (pbuh) or the Shari'ah of Isa (pbuh) upon an Ummah to which it did not belong. Rabbi Benamozegh taught that the Prophet (pbuh) was sent by Allah SWT to relieve the burden of the nation. To restore the older, original covenant with mankind, and to make clear the path for his Ummah to follow.

In this context we can understand the verses:

And the Jews [who wished to control Arabia] say: The Christians do not follow anything (good) and the Christians [who wished to control Arabia] say: The Jews do not follow anything (good) while they recite the (same) Book. Even thus say those who have no knowledge, like to what they say; so Allah shall judge between them on the day of resurrection in how they are different. (Surat Al-Baqara 113)

And the Jews will not be pleased with you, nor the Christians until you follow their religion. Say: Surely Allah's guidance, that is the (true) guidance. And if you follow their desires after the knowledge that has come to you, you shall have no guardian from Allah, nor any helper. (Surat Al-Baqara 120)

Judaism agrees with this. The great scholar Maimonides taught that Islam is a return to the monotheism of Abraham. God sent [Qur'anic] Islam to help make straight the path for the King Messiah (Mahdi) and to prepare the whole world to serve the God together. (Teshuvot ha-Rambam 2, no. 293)

In general the ahadith clearly indicate the Prophet (pbuh) opposed the mixing of the Mosaic Shari'ah with the Quranic Shari'ah. Judaism also teaches this.

"Narrated Abu Huraira: Allah's Apostle said, "The Jews and the Christians do not dye (their grey hair), so you shall do the opposite of what they do." (Sahih Bukhari Volume 4, Book 56, Number 668)

However, this doesn't mean that one Shari'ah is better or worse than another. It means that each Shari'ah is given to an Ummah.

"From amongst all those ummahs you are among the ummah that has been allotted to me and from amongst all the prophets I am the prophet who hath been assigned to you." (Musnad Ahmad)

Allah SWT could have made mankind one Ummah, with one Shari'ah. But we know that each Ummah has been given its own Shari'ah and that we are to compete, as if in a race, for good deeds and virtue.

"To each among you have we prescribed a Shariah (law) and Minhaj (custom). If Allah had so willed, He could have made you a single Ummah (faith community), but (His plan is) to test you in what He hath given you: so strive as in a race in all virtues. The goal of you all is to Allah; it is He that will show you the truth about the matters in which you are different"; (Al Maeda 48)

Its a race that everyone wins.

Sunday, January 16, 2011

IRAN 1979-89: First decade of the Islamic Republic, Last decade of Imam Khomeni's (r.a.) life

Unity between Shi'is and Sunnis was one of Imam Khomeni's (r.a.) lasting concerns; he was, indeed, the first Shi'i authority to declare unconditionally valid prayers performed by Shi'is behind a Sunni imam (Istifta'at, I, p. 279).

Imam Khomeini's (r.a.) role was central in shaping the political order in Iran that emerged from the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

At first it appeared that Imam Khomeini (r.a.) might exercise his directive role from Qum, for he moved there from Tehran on February 29, causing Qum to become in effect a second capital of Iran.

On March 30 and 31, a nationwide referendum resulted in a massive vote in favor of the establishment of an Islamic Republic. Imam Khomeini (r.a.) proclaimed the next day, April 1, 1979, as the "first day of God's government" (Sahifa-yi Nur, V, p. 233). The institutionalization of the new order continued with the election, on August 3, of an Assembly of Experts (Majlis-I Khubragan), entrusted with the task of reviewing a draft constitution that had been put forward on June 18; fifty-five of the seventy-three persons elected were religious scholars.

It was not however to be expected that a smooth transition from the old regime would prove possible. The powers and duties of the Council of the Islamic Revolutionary, which was intended to serve as an interim legislature, were not clearly delineated from those of the provisional government headed by Bazargan. More importantly, significant differences of outlook and approach separated the two bodies from each other. The council, composed predominantly of 'ulama', favored immediate and radical change and sought to strengthen the revolutionary organs that had come into being - the revolutionary committees, the revolutionary courts charged with punishing members of the former regime charged with serious crimes, and the Corps of Guards of the Islamic Revolution (Sipah-I Pasdaran-I Inqilab-I Islami), established on May 5, 1979. The government, headed by Bazargan and comprising mainly liberal technocrats of Islamic orientation, sought as swift a normalization of the situation as possible and the gradual phasing out of the revolutionary institutions.

Although Imam Khomeini encouraged members of the two bodies to cooperate and refrained, on most occasions, from arbitrating their differences, his sympathies were clearly with the Council of the Islamic Revolution. On July 1, Bazargan offered the Imam his resignation. It was refused, and four members of the council - Rafsanjani, Bahunar, Mahdavi-Kani, and Ayatullah Sayyid 'Ali Khamna'i - joined Bazargan's cabinet in an effort to improve the coordination of the two bodies. In addition to these frictions at the governmental level, a further element of instability was provided by the terrorist activities of shadowy groups that were determined to rob the nascent Islamic republic of some of its most capable personalities. Thus on May 1, 1979, Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahhari, a leading member of the Council of the Islamic Revolution and a former pupil close to the Imam's heart, was assassinated in Tehran. For once, the Imam wept in an open display of grief.

The final break between Bazargan and the revolution came as a consequence of the occupation of the United States embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979 by a coalition of students from the universities of Tehran. Despite declarations of willingness to "honor the will of the Iranian people" and its recognition of the Islamic Republic, the American government had admitted the Shah to the United States on October 22, 1979.

The pretext was his need for medical treatment, but it was widely feared in Iran that his arrival in America, where large numbers of high-ranking officials of the previous regime had gathered, might be the prelude to an American-sponsored attempt to restore him to power, on the lines of the successful CIA coup of August 1953. The Shah's extradition to Iran was therefore demanded by the students occupying the embassy as a condition for their liberating the hostages they were holding there.

It is probable that the students had cleared their action in advance with close associates of Imam Khomeini, for he swiftly extended his protection to them, proclaiming their action "a greater revolution than the first" (Sahifa-yi Nur, X, p. 141). Two days later, he predicted that confronted by this "second revolution," America would be "unable to do a damned thing (Amrika hich ghalati namitavanad bukunad)" (Sahifa-yi Nur, X, p. 149). This prediction seemed extravagant to many in Iran, but a military expedition mounted by the United States on April 22, 1980 to rescue the American hostages and possibly, too, to attack sensitive sites in Tehran, came to an abrupt and humiliating end when the American gunships crashed into each other in a sandstorm near Tabas in south-Eastern Iran. On April 7, the United States had formally broken diplomatic ties with Iran, a move welcomed by Imam Khomeini as an occasion of rejoicing for the Iranian nation (Sahifa-yi Nur, XII, p. 40). It was not until January 21, 1981 that the American hostages were finally released.

Two days after the occupation of the US embassy, Bazargan once again offered his resignation, and this time it was accepted. In addition, the provisional government was dissolved, and the Council of the Islamic Revolution temporarily assumed the task of running the country. This marked the definitive departure of Bazargan and like-minded individuals from the scene; henceforth the term "liberal" became a pejorative designation for those who questioned the fundamental tendencies of the revolution. In addition, the students occupying the embassy had access to extensive files the Americans had kept on various Iranian personalities who had frequented the embassy over the years; these documents were now published and discredited the personalities involved. Most importantly, the occupation of the embassy constituted a "second revolution" in that Iran now offered a unique example of defiance of the American superpower and became established for American policymakers as their principal adversary in the Middle East.

The enthusiasm aroused by the occupation of the embassy also helped to ensure a large turnout for the referendum that was held on December 2 and 3, 1979 to ratify the constitution that had been approved by the Assembly of Experts on November 15. The constitution, which was overwhelmingly approved, differed greatly from the original draft, above all through its inclusion of the principle of vilayat-i faqih as its basic and determining principle.

Mentioned briefly in the preamble, it was spelled out in full in Article Five: "During the Occultation of the Lord of the Age (Sahib al-Zaman; i.e., the Twelfth Imam) the governance and leadership of the nation devolve upon the just and pious faqih who is acquainted with the circumstances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability; and recognized and accepted as leader (rahbar) by the majority of the people. In the event that no faqih should be so recognized by the majority, the leader, or leadership council, composed of fuqaha' possessing the aforementioned qualifications, will assume these responsibilities." Article 109 specified the qualifications and attributes of the leader as "suitability with respect to learning and piety, as required for the functions of mufti and marja'." Article 110 listed his powers, which include supreme command of the armed forces, appointment of the head of the judiciary, signing the decree formalizing the election of the president of the republic, and - under certain conditions - dismissing him (Qanun-i Asasi-yi Jumhuri-yi Islami-yi Iran, Tehran, 1370 Sh./1991, pp. 23-24, 53-58).

These articles formed the constitutional basis for Imam Khomeini's leadership role. In addition, from July 1979 onwards, he had been appointing Imam Jum'a's for every major city, who not only delivered the Friday sermon but also acted as his personal representatives.

Most government institutions also had a representative of the Imam assigned to them. However, the ultimate source of his influence was his vast moral and spiritual prestige, which led to him being designated primarily as Imam, in the sense of one dispensing comprehensive leadership to the community (Suggestions that the use of this title assimilated him to the Twelve Imams of Shi'i belief and hence attributed infallibility to him are groundless).

On January 23, 1980, Imam Khomeini was brought from Qum to Tehran to receive treatment for a heart ailment. After thirty-nine days in hospital, he took up residence in the north Tehran suburb of Darband, and on April 22 he moved into a modest house in Jamaran, another suburb to the north of the capital. A closely guarded compound grew up around the house, and it was there that he was destined to spend the rest of his life.

On January 25, during the Imam's hospitalization, Abu 'l-Hasan Bani Sadr, a French-educated economist, was elected first president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. His success had been made possible in part by the Imam's decision that it was not opportune to have a religious scholar stand for election. This event, followed on March 14 by the first elections to the Majlis, might have counted as a further step to the institutionalization and stabilization of the political system. However, Bani Sadr's tenure, together with the tensions that soon arose between him and a majority of the deputies in the Majlis, occasioned a severe crisis that led ultimately to Bani Sadr's dismissal. For the president, his inherent megalomania aggravated by his victory at the polls, was reluctant to concede supremacy to Imam Khomeini, and he therefore attempted to build up a personal following, consisting largely of former leftists who owed their positions exclusively to him. In this enterprise, he inevitably clashed with the newly formed Islamic Republic Party (Hizb-i Jumhuri-yi Islami), headed by Ayatullah Bihishti, which dominated the Majlis and was loyal to what was referred to as "the line of the Imam" (khatt-i Imam). As he had earlier done with the disputes between the provisional government and the Council of the Islamic Revolution, the Imam sought to reconcile the parties, and on September 11 1980 appealed to all branches of government and their members to set aside their differences.

While this new governmental crisis was brewing, on September 22, 1980, Iraq sent its forces across the Iranian border and launched a war of aggression that was to last for almost eight years. Iraq enjoyed financial support in this venture from the Arab states lining the Persian Gulf, above all from Saudi Arabia. Imam Khomeini, however, correctly regarded the United States as the principal instigator of the war from the outset, and American involvement became increasingly visible as the war wore on. Although Iraq advanced territorial claims against Iran, the barely disguised purpose of the aggression was to take advantage of the dislocations caused in Iran by the revolution, particularly the weakening of the army through purges of disloyal officers, and to destroy the Islamic Republic. As he had done during the revolution, Imam Khomeini insisted on an uncompromising stance and inspired a steadfast resistance which prevented the easy Iraqi victory many foreign observers had confidently foretold. Initially, however, Iraq enjoyed some success, capturing the port city of Khurramshahr and encircling Abadan.

The conduct of the war became one more issue at dispute between Bani Sadr and his opponents. Continuing his efforts at reconciling the factions, Imam Khomeini established a three-man commission to investigate the complaints each had against the other. The commission reported on June 1, 1981 that Bani Sadr was guilty of violating the constitution and contravening the Imam's instructions.

He was accordingly declared incompetent by the Majlis to function as president, and the next day, in accordance with Article 110 section (e) of the constitution, Imam Khomeini dismissed him. He went into hiding, and on July 28 fled to Paris, disguised as a woman.

Toward the end of his presidency, Bani Sadr had allied himself with the Sazman-i Mujahidin-i Khalq (Organization of People's Strugglers; however, the group is commonly known in Iran as munafiqin, "hypocrites," not mujahidin, because of its members' hostility to the Islamic Republic). An organization with a tortuous ideological and political history, it had hoped, like Bani Sadr, to displace Imam Khomeini and capture power for itself. After Bani Sadr went into exile, members of the organization embarked on a campaign of assassinating government leaders in the hope that the Islamic Republic would collapse. Even before Bani Sadr fled, a massive explosion had destroyed the headquarters of the Islamic Republic Party, killing more than seventy people including Ayatullah Bihishti. On August 30, 1981, Muhammad 'Ali Raja'i, Bani Sadr's successor as president, was killed in another explosion. Other assassinations followed over the next two years, including five Imam Jum'a's as well as a host of lesser figures. Throughout these disasters, Imam Khomeini maintained his customary composure, declaring, for example, after the assassination of Raja'i that the killings would change nothing and in fact showed Iran to be "the most stable country in the world," given the ability of the government to continue functioning in an orderly manner (Sahifa-yi Nur, XV, p. 130). The fact that Iran was able to withstand such blows internally while continuing the war of defense against Iraq was indeed testimony to the roots the new order had struck and to the undiminished prestige of Imam Khomeini as the leader of the nation.

Ayatullah Khamna'i, a longtime associate and devotee of the Imam, was elected president on October 2, 1981, and he remained in this position until he succeeded him as leader of the Islamic Republic on his death in 1989. No governmental crises comparable to those of the first years of the Islamic Republic occurred during his tenure.

Nonetheless, structural problems persisted. The constitution provided that legislation passed by the Majlis should be reviewed by a body of senior fuqaha' known as the Council of Guardians (Shaura-yi Nagahban) to ensure its conformity with the provisions of Ja'fari fiqh. This frequently led to a stalemate on a variety of important legislative issues. On at least two occasions, in October 1981 and January 1983, Hashimi- Rafsanjani, then chairman of the Majlis, requested the Imam to arbitrate decisively, drawing on the prerogatives inherent in the doctrine of vilayat-i faqih, in order to break the deadlock. He was reluctant to do so, always preferring that a consensus should emerge. However, on January 6, 1988, in a letter addressed to Khamna'i, the Imam put forward a far-reaching definition of vilayat-i faqih, now termed "absolute" (mutlaqa), which made it theoretically possible for the leadership to override all conceivable objections to the policies it supported. Governance, Imam Khomeini proclaimed, is the most important of all divine ordinances (ahkam-i ilahi) and it takes precedence over secondary divine ordinances (ahkam-i far'iya-yi ilahiya). Not only does the Islamic state permissibly enforce a large number of laws not mentioned specifically in the sources of the shari'a, such as the prohibition of narcotics and the levying of customs dues; it can also suspend the performance of a fundamental religious duty, the hajj, when this is necessitated by the higher interest of the Muslims (Sahifa-yi Nur, XX, pp. 170-71). At first sight, the theory of vilayat-i mutlaqa-yi faqih might appear to be a justification for unlimited individual rule by the leader (rahbar). One month later, however, Imam Khomeini delegated these broadly defined prerogatives to a commission named the Assembly for the Determination of the Interest of the Islamic Order (Majma'-i Tashkhis-i Maslahat-i Nizam-i Islami). This standing body has the power to settle decisively all differences on legislation between the Majlis and the Council of Guardians.

The war against Iraq continued to preoccupy Iran until July 1988.

Iran had come to define its war aims as not simply the liberation of all parts of its territory occupied by Iraq, but also the overhrow of the regime of Saddam Husayn. A number of military victories made this goal appear attainable. On November 29, 1981, Imam Khomeini congratulated his military commanders on successes achieved in Khuzistan, remarking that the Iraqis had been obliged to retreat before the faith of the Iranian troops and their eagerness for martyrdom (Sahifa-yi Nur, XV, p. 234). The following year,on May 24, Khurramshahr, which had been held by the Iraqis since shortly after the outbreak of war, was liberated, and only small pockets of Iranian territory remained in Iraqi hands. The Imam marked the occasion by condemning anew the Persian Gulf states that supported Saddam Husayn and describing the victory as a divine gift (Sahifa-yi Nur, XVI, pp. 154-5). Iran failed, however, to follow up swiftly on its surprise victory and the momentum, which might have made possible the destruction of Saddam Husayn's regime, was lost as the tide of war flowed back and forth. The United States was, in any event, determined to deny Iran a decisive victory and stepped up its intervention in the conflict in a variety of ways. Finally, on July 2, 1988, the US navy stationed in the Persian Gulf shot down a civilian Iranian airliner, with the loss of 290 passengers. With the utmost reluctance, Imam Khomeini agreed to end the war on the terms specified in Resolution 598 of the United Nations Security Council, comparing his decision in a lenghty statement issued on July 20 to the drinking of poison (Sahifa-yi Nur, XXI, pp. 227-44).

Any notion that the acceptance of a ceasefire with Iraq signaled a diminution in the Imam's readiness to confront the enemies of Islam was dispelled when, on February 14, 1989, he issued a fatva calling for the execution of Salman Rushdie, author of the obscene and blasphemous novel, The Satanic Verses, as well as those responsible for the publication and dissemination of the work. The fatva received a great deal of support in the Muslim world as the most authoritative articulation of popular outrage at Rushdie's gross insult to Islam. Although its demand remained unfulfilled, it demonstrated plainly the consequences that would have to be faced by any aspiring imitator of Rushdie, and thus had an important deterrent effect. Generally overlooked at the time was the firm grounding of the Imam's fatva in the existing provisions of both Shi'i and Sunni jurisprudence; it was not therefore innovative. What lent the fatva particular significance was rather its issuance by the Imam as a figure of great moral authority.

The Imam had also gained the attention of the outside world, albeit in a less spectacular way, on January 4, 1989, when he sent Mikhail Gorbachev, then general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a letter in which he predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of communism: "Henceforth it will be necessary to look for communism in the museums of political history of the world." He also warned Gorbachev and the Russian people against replacing communism with Western-style materialism: "The basic problem of your country has nothing to do with ownership, the economy, or freedom; it is the lack of a true belief in God, the same problem that has drawn the West into a blind alley of triviality and purposelessness" (Ava-yi Tauhid, Tehran, 1367 Sh./1989, pp. 3-5).

Internally, however, the most important development in the last year of Imam Khomeini's life was, without doubt, his dismissal of Ayatullah Muntaziri from the position of successor to the leadership of the Islamic Republic. Once a student and close associate of the Imam, who had gone so far as to call him "the fruit of my life," Muntaziri had had among his associates over the years persons executed for counterrevolutionary activity, including a son-in-law, Mahdi Hashimi, and made farreaching criticisms of the Islamic Republic, particularly with regard to judicial matters. On July 31, 1988, he wrote a letter to the Imam questioning what he regarded as unjustified executions of members of the Sazman-i Mujahidin-i Khalq held in Iranian prisons after the organization, from its base in Iraq, had made a large-scale incursion into Iranian territory in the closing stages of the Iran-Iraq war. Matters came to a head the following year, and on March 28, 1989, the Imam wrote to Muntaziri accepting his resignation from the succession, a resignation which under the circumstances he was compelled to offer (Sahifa-yi Nur, XXI, p. 112).

Funeral

On June 3, 1989, after eleven days in hospital for an operation to stop internal bleeding, Imam Khomeini lapsed into a critical condition and died. The outpouring of grief was massive and spontaneous, the exact counterpoint to the vast demonstrations of joy that had greeted his return to Iran a little over ten years earlier. Such was the press of mourners, estimated at some nine million, that the body ultimately had to be transported by helicopter to its place of burial to the south of Tehran on the road leading to Qum. A still expanding complex of structures has grown up around the shrine of the Imam, making it likely that it will become the center of an entire new city devoted to ziyara and religious learning.

The testament of Imam Khomeini was published soon after his death. A lengthy document, it addresses itself principally to the various classes of Iranian society, urging them to do whatever is necessary for the preservation and strengthening of the Islamic Republic.

Significantly, however, it begins with an extended meditation on the hadith-i thaqalayn: "I leave among you two great and precious things: the Book of God and my progeny; they will never be separated from each other until they meet me at the pool." The Imam interprets the misfortunes that have befallen Muslims throughout history and more particularly in the present age as the result of efforts precisely to disengage the Qur'an from the progeny of the Prophet (s.a.w.s.)

The legacy of Imam Khomeini was considerable. He had bequeathed to Iran not only a political system enshrining the principles both of religious leadership and of an elected legislature and head of the executive branch, but also a whole new ethos and self-image, a dignified stance of independence vis-vis the West rare in the Muslim world. He was deeply imbued with the traditions and worldview of Shi'i Islam, but he viewed the revolution he had led and the republic he had founded as the nucleus for a worldwide awakening of all Muslims. He had sought to attain this goal by, among other things, issuing proclamations to the hujjaj on a number of occasions and alerting them to the dangers arising from American dominance of the Middle East, the tireless activity of Israel for subverting the Muslim world, and the subservience to America and Israel of numerous Middle Eastern governments. Unity between Shi'is and Sunnis was one of his lasting concerns; he was, indeed, the first Shi'i authority to declare unconditionally valid prayers performed by Shi'is behind a Sunni imam (Istifta'at, I, p. 279).

It must finally be stressed that despite the amplitude of his political achievements, Imam Khomeini's personality was essentially that of a gnostic for whom political activity was but the natural outgrowth of an intense inner life of devotion. The comprehensive vision of Islam that he both articulated and exemplified is, indeed, his most significant legacy.